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EPA IMPACT STATEMENTS REQUIRED
UNDER CLEAN AIR ACT
In Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus1 the District Court for the
District of Colorado held that, under section 102(2)(C) of the Na-
tional Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),2 the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is required to file an environmental impact
statement3 before promulgating a Clean Air Act state implementa-
tion plan.4 In accordance with section 110 of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970,5 the governor of Montana had submitted an
implementation plan to EPA for approval. 6  EPA specifically re-
jected certain aspects of the plan, citing in particular the plan's failure
to provide a control strategy for sulphur oxides emissions from non-
ferrous smelters,7 and subsequently proposed its own implementa-
tion plans for emissions limitation on those sulphur oxides.9 The
Anaconda Company, a large Montana copper smelter, sought to en-
join implementation of the proposed EPA plan pending preparation
1. 352 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1972).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
3. An environmental impact statement is described in NEPA as a detailed
statement on the environmental impact of a proposed agency action, including the
unavoidable adverse effects, the alternatives, and the resources to be committed. See
42 U.S.C. § 4332(c) (1970). These statements must be made available to the
President, the Council on Environmental Quality, and the public. Id. For an analy-
sis of the response of various federal agencies to this mandate, see Address by Mr.
Baldwin, Law Forum and Environmental Law Society of Stanford Law School, Dec.
9, 1970, reprinted in F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw, SoURcEs AND PROBLEMS § 13.01,
at 19 (1971).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1970). A state implementation plan sets forth the maxi-
mum amount of air pollution emissions which will be permitted from specific sources
within a specific geographic area, and also sets a timetable for compliance with these
emission standards. The standards must be based on the underlying federal "air
quality criteria" required by section 109 of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970. See id. § 1857c-4.
5. Id. § 1857c-5.
6. Approval by EPA can only be granted if the state plan or plans meet pri-
mary and secondary air quality standards set by the federal government under sec-
tion 109 of the Act.
7. Sulphur oxides are common by-products from the smelting of non-ferrous
metals such as copper.
8. Section 110(c) requires EPA to prepare and publish proposed regulations
setting forth all or part of an implementation plan for a state if that state has failed
to submit an implementation plan, if a plan or portion thereof has failed to meet
the requirements of the Act, or if a state has failed to revise a deficient implemen-
tation plan within a specified period of time. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
9. 352 F. Supp. at 700.
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of an environmental impact statement pursuant to section 102(2)
(C) of NEPA. EPA responded that the legislative history of
NEPA made it clear that the Act was not intended to apply to an
agency such as EPA.10 In rejecting the EPA argument, the court
held that, if regulations will have a significant effect upon the en-
vironment, an enviromental impact statement must be prepared by
the EPA before those regulations could be implemented under the
Clean Air Act."
NEPA was intended both to impose a broad scope of environ-
mental responsibility upon federal agencies and to insure that fed-
eral agencies would not unnecessarily contribute to environmental
deteriorarion. 2  In furtherance of these purposes, the Act prescribes
10. Id. at 710. EPA argued further, id. at 713, that any doubts in this regard
had been erased by a provision in section 511(c) of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Amendments:
[No action of the [EPA] Administrator taken pursuant to this Act shall be
deemed a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the
human environment within the meaning of the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969 . . . . Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 511(c) (Oct. 18, 1972),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CoNe. & AD. NEws 4825, 4919 (1972).
11. Although beyond the scope of this discussion, two other major issues were
resolved in this case. EPA contended that section 307 of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (1970), which provides for review by petition to circuit courts of
appeal for already promulgated state plans, barred a suit in federal district court to
enjoin an EPA proposed implementation plan. 352 F. Supp. at 710-11. The court
held that section 307 did not bar the suit because the proposed plan had not yet
been implemented and thus no review was available to Anaconda under section 307.
In response to Anaconda's argument that EPA was required to hold an adjudicatory
hearing before promulgating an EPA proposed implementation plan, the court ruled
that the hearing must be held because the plan applied solely to Anaconda. Id.
at 703. EPA plans to appeal the decision in the Anaconda case. See Statement of
John R. Quarles, Jr., Dec. 11, 1972, cited in 3 ENmroNmnNTAL L. REP. 940
(Dec. 15, 1972).
12. Section 101 (a) of NEPA deiclares the national environmental policy:
The Congress . . . declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal
Government.. . to use all practical... measures... m a manner calcu-
lated to foster and promote the general welfare, to create and maintain con-
ditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and
fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of present and future
generations of Americans. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1970).
After setting out the objectives of the national policy, section 101(b) declares
that through the improvement and coordination of federal plans, functions, and pro-
grams, the Nation may,
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without
degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unin-
tended consequences. Id. § 4331(b).
For examination of the purposes of NEPA in more detail, see Peterson, An
Analysis of Title I of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 1 BNA EN-
ViRONMENTAL L. RaP. 10035 (1970); Note, The National Environmental Policy Act:
A Sheep in Wolf's Clothing?, 37 BRoorKLN L. Rav. 139 (1970); Note, NEPA: Birth
and Infancy, 20 CaTi. U.L. Rav. 184 (1970).
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both substantive and procedural duties for federal agencies. The
substantive thrust is delivered primarily in section 102(1):
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent pos-
sible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the United
States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this [Act] .... 13
The Act's legislative history reveals that the phrase "to the fullest ex-
tent possible" provides a limited exception to compliance with the
substantive duties of NEPA for agencies granted independent, stat-
utory environmental responsibility; to the extent that another statute
expressly prohibits or makes compliance with one or more sections
of NEPA impossible, such an agency is exempt from compliance.14
The procedural requirements of NEPA are set forth in section
102(2).15  The most important of these, section 102(2)(C), re-
quires federal agencies to prepare a detailed statement of potential
environmental impact for "major federal actions significantly affect-
ing the quality of the human environment." 16  The legislative his-
tory does not specifically indicate whether, in the absence of express
statutory conflict, these procedural requirements were intended to
apply to the regulatory programs of agencies, such as EPA, with in-
dependent, environmental responsibility.
The Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which is author-
ized to issue advisory guidelines to federal agencies for the imple-
mentation of section 102(2)(C), 17 has determined, on the basis of
its reading of NEPA's legislative history, that section 102(2)(C) is
totally inapplicable to EPA. 18 The CEQ Guidelines provide that the
regulatory activities taken by EPA will not be deemed actions which
require the preparation of environmental impact statements. In the
Guidelines, however, CEQ did not state what portions of the legisla-
tive history led to this interpretation. The most persuasive support
for CEQ's position is found in the report of "Major Changes in S.1075
13. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(l) (1970).
14. See H. REP. No. 765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), where it is stated:
The purpose of the. . . language [to the fullest extent possible] is to make
it clear that each agency of the Federal Government shall comply with the
directives set out in such subparagraphs (A) through (H) unless the ex-
isting law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or
makes full compliance with one of the directives impossible. Id. at 9.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970).
16. Id.
17. CEQ was granted this authority by an executive order. See Exec. Order
No. 11,514, 3 C.F.R. 526, 528 (1972).
18. CEQ GUrmELrEs § 5(d), 36 Fed. Reg, 7724, 7725 (1971).
Vol. 1973:157]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
as passed by the Senate" (the senate version of NEPA).10  In refer-
ence to environmental protective agencies such as the National Park
Service, the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration, and
the National Air Pollution Control Administration, the report stated:
The provisions of section 102 .. . are not designed to result in
any change in the manner in which [these agencies] carry out their
environmental protection authority. 20
Six months after the passage of NEPA, the EPA was established and
assumed the functions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Ad-
ministration and the National Air Pollution Control Administra-
tion.21 Thus, if it can be assumed that "any change in the manner"
in which agencies carry out their environmental protection authority
refers to procedural as well as substantive matters, the EPA should
be exempt from section 102(2)(C) of the NEPA.
The validity of CEQ's conclusion, however, is doubtful; the sub-
stance of section 10Ts legislative history may not have been directed
at the procedural provisions, but only at the substantive obligations
of that section. A further statement found in "Major Changes to
S.1075," in reference to the phrase "to the fullest extent possible, '22
indicates that the phrase "shall not be used by any Federal agency as
a means to avoiding [sic] compliance with the [procedural require-
ments] set out in Section 102.' 23 Moreover, NEPA's sponsor, Sen-
ator Jackson, stated during the debate preceding passage of the bill
that any deviation from full compliance with the substantive goals
of NEPA must be "justified in light of public scrutiny as required by
section 102"--that is, by an impact statement. 24  Thus, as can be
seen, the legislative history of NEPA is, at best, inconclusive as to
whether Congress intended the procedural requirements of section
102 to apply to an environmental protection agency such as the EPA.
Congressional intent in this area is also difficult to discern, because
the NEPA hearings focused chiefly on the water and air programs;
yet EPA, established six months after the passage of NEPA, as-
sumed control not only over the water and air programs 2 but also
19. 115 CoNG. REc. 40417 (1969) (report of the Senate conferees to the Senate).
20. Id. at 40418 (emphasis added).
21. EPA was established and these programs transferred to it by Executive Re-
organization Plan No. 3 of 1970. See 3 C.F.R. §§ 199-200 (1970). See note 26
infra.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
23. 115 CONG. REc. 40418 (emphasis added).
24. Id. at 40416 (emphasis added).
25. See note 21 supra.
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substantial control over pesticides, radiation, and solid wastes dis-
posal, 26 areas virtually ignored during the discussions in the NEPA
hearings of section 102.
Although the legislative history of NEPA may be inconclusive
as to this issue, it is clear that the EPA was intended to coordinate
and give coherence to the broad environmental policies contained in
NEPA.2'7 EPA has taken the position that NEPA was designed
only to insure that the non-environmental, "mission-oriented" agen-
cies would consider environmental values in decision making.28 1le-
cause of the central role EPA plays in the protection of the environ-
ment, it is apparent that the agency's function differs markedly from
the non-environmental "mission-oriented" agencies. Contending
that this role gives it a broader environmental "perspective," 29 EPA
26. The programs transferred to EPA under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,
supra note 21, include: (1) functions with respect to pesticide studies, from the
Department of the Interior; (2) the pesticides registration program of the Agriculural
Research Service, from the Department of Agriculture; (3) the pesticides research
and standard-setting programs limiting pesticide residues in food, from the Food and
Drug Administration; (4) the environmental radiation standards programs establish-
ing environmental radiation standards and emissions limits for radioactivity, from
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Federal Radiation Council; (5) functions car-
ried out by the Bureau of Solid Waste Management, from the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. See Message of the President Relative to Reorganization
Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, H.R. Doc. No. 366, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
Environmental responsibilities not transferred to the EPA include, inter alia,
authority of the Food and Drug Administration to remove from the market food
with excess pesticide residues, authority of the Atomic Energy Commission to
implement and enforce radiation standards through its licensing authority, and reg-
ulation of radiation from consumer products by the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare. Id. at 4.
27. In formulating the recommendation for the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency, the President's Council on Executive Reorganization stated one
of the agency's objectives to be "[r]esearch and standard-setting based on a com-
prehensive view of. . .the planet's ecology, the economic costs of pollution and its
abatement, considering also the benefits . .. that may accrue from the. . . activi-
ties that give rise to pollution." Hearings on Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970
Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Governmental Operations, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 46 (1970). President Nixon, in a message to Congress accompanying the re-
organization plan which established the EPA, noted that the need for NEPA arose
because
[olur national government today is not structured to make a coordi-
nated attack on the pollutants which debase [the environment]. Indeed, the
present governmental structure for dealing with environmental pollution of-
ten defies effective and concerted action. Message of the President Relative
to Reorganization Plans Nos. 3 and 4 of 1970, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Joint Hearings on the Operation of the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 Before the Committees on Public Works and Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess. 546 (1972) (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus).
29. Mr. Ruckelshaus, in arguing that section 102(2) (C) of NEPA as applied to
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has argued that its role makes the procedural requirements of NEPA
unnecessary.30 However, EPA's argument is weakened by the re-
fusal of courts, in ruling on the applicability and scope of NEPA's
procedural provisions, to differentiate between those agencies with
environmental improvement authority and the other agencies which
are merely guided by NEPA generally."1 For example, the sem-
inal case on NEPA applicability, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Com-
mittee v. AEC,32 dealt with a "non-environmental" agency, the
Atomic Energy Commission. The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit read literally the "all Federal agencies" phrase
of section 102(2), ruling that the procedural duties of NEPA are
mandatory and binding upon the AEC and all federal agencies. 88
Since the AEC did not have an independent environmental man-
date, it was not necessary for the court to decide whether independ-
ent, statutory environmental responsibility would affect the applica-
bility of NEPA. The decision, however, has been subsequently in-
the EPA would be superfluous, has stated:
We wouldn't be doing our job if we did not consider within the agency
all of the alternatives in adopting standards ....
If we did not do that. . . we would not even be close to discharg-
ing our responsibilities as an agency. Id. at 555.
Since under this argument EPA's mission is solely environmental, it is entirely un-
necessary to impose the additional and redundant burden of preparing impact state-
ments for EPA regulatory activities. Id. at 556.
30. This position is weakened by EPA's express declaration in Anaconda that,
when promulgating Clean Air Act implementation plans, only air pollution factors
will be considered. See notes 49-51 infra and accompanying text.
31. See notes 34-35 infra. However, in ordering EPA to reconsider its rejection
of four major automobile manufacturers' application for suspension of the 1975
emission standards for light duty vehicles pursuant to section 202 of the Clean Air
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857f- (b) (5) (B) (1970), the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, - F.2d - (D.C.
Cir. 1972), stated:
Although we do not reach the question of whether EPA is automatically
and completely exempt from NEPA, we see little need in requiring a NEPA
statement from an agency whose raison d'etre is the protection of the en-
vironment, and whose decision on suspension is necessarily infused [by the
Clean Air Act, § 202 (b)(5)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-(b) (5) (D) (1970)]
with. . . environmental considerations. - F.2d at - (emphasis added).
The court was impelled to this conclusion by its belief that to require an environ-
mental impact statement, in addition to EPA's suspension decision setting forth the
same considerations, would be "a legalism carried to the extreme." Id. at -. In
Anaconda, however, EPA contended that it could not consider environmental factors
other than air pollution in evaluating state implementation plans for primary
and secondary national ambient air standards. 352 F. Supp. at 704. See notes
49-51 infra and accompanying text.
32. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
33. Id. at 1114-15.
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terpreted to apply to environmental protective agencies such as the
Forest Service34 and the Army Corps of Engineers. 5
In Anaconda, EPA raised two alternative arguments to support
the agency's contention that it was exempt from the procedural re-
quirements of NEPA. First, EPA contended that the 1972 amend-
ments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA) 6 had
been intended to exempt EPA activities from NEPA. The court
summarily rejected this contention, however, and pointed out that
the language of the FWPCA37 was obviously intended only to re-
move regulatory activities performed under that Act from the proce-
dural requirements of NEPA. 8 EPA's second argument was based
upon the agency's reading of a 1972 decision handed down by the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Getty Oil Co. v. Ruckel-
shaus s9 In Getty, the plaintiff had contended that EPA's failure
34. In Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), the Tenth
Circuit recognized the duty of the Forest Service to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement in connection with the building of a national highway. The court
apparently attached no significance to the environmental status of the agency, rul-
ing that the Forest Service was obligated to prepare the statement because it was
the "lead" agency-the agency which had primary responsibility for the project.
Id. at 1236.
35. In EDF, Inc. v. Corps. of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), the Eighth
Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling that the Corps of Engineers was required to file
an impact statement in the construction of a dam, basing its decision on the as-
sumption that NEPA applies indiscriminately to all federal agencies. Id. at 295. An
earlier district court case, Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1(D.D.C. 1971), expressly
raised, for the first time, the issue of whether an environmental protective agency
is exempt from the filing of section 102 statements. In Kalur, several plaintiffs al-
leged that an Army Corps of Engineers regulation exempting Refuse Act discharge
permits from the NEPA section 102 requirements was invalid. The court upheld
this contention, stating that all agencies are bound by NEPA and that there is "no
exception . . . carved out for those agencies that may be viewed as environmental
improvement agencies." Id. at 15. In a 1972 case similar to Kalur, Sierra Club v.
Sargent, - F. Supp. - (W.D. Wash. 1972), the plaintiffs also sought to enjoin
issuance of a Refuse Act permit issued by the Corps of Engineers. The injunction
was sought partially on the theory that impact statements were required by NEPA
prior to issuance of the permits. In Sierra Club, the Corps had advanced the same
argument now utilized by the EPA in Anaconda: unlike many other agencies, the
Corps is an environmental protective agency and will therefore automatically con-
sider environmental factors, making the requirement of an impact statement dupli-
cative and wasteful. In its order, the court rejected this argument and ruled that the
Corps of Engineers was required to prepare an environmental impact statement be-
fore issuance of the permit. Id. at -.
36. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 511(c) (Oct. 18, 1972).
37. See note 10 supra.
38. 352 F. Supp. at 713.
39. 468 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1972).
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to prepare an environmental impact statement rendered ultra vires an
EPA enforcement order directing compliance with a previously ap-
proved air quality plan.4 0  The Third Circuit found it unnecessary
to rule on the contention, holding that the NEPA issue could be
properly raised only in a proceeding initiated within thirty days of the
promulgation of such plans and not during the enforcement pe-
riod. 1 However, the court nevertheless noted that, in any event,
the cases cited by the plaintiff,42 Getty Oil Co., were "not persuasive
that the EPA was bound by NEPA. '43  The Anaconda court dis-
agreed with the Third Circuit's dictum,14 holding that EPA was so
bound. Following the reasoning of Calvert Cliffs'," Judge Winner
also refused to differentiate between environmental and non-environ-
mental agencies, and found that the Calvert Cliffs' ruling40 and sub-
sequent cases 47 were accurately descriptive of NEPA's mandatory
nature. He ruled that the language "all federal agencies" in section
102 was dispositive and concluded that Congress intended all agen-
cies under their authority to follow the substantive and procedural
mandates of NEPA4
The Anaconda court also displayed great concern that EPA had
insisted that in determining proper air emission standards the agency
could not and "will not consider . . .environmental factors" other
than air pollution. 49  EPA had contended that the Clean Air Act
mandates only consideration of air pollution in evaluating state im-
plementation plansA0 The court found EPA's position to be con-
40. Id. at 359.
41. See id. The Getty court interpreted section 307 of the Clean Air Act, 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(2) (1970), as absolutely precluding review of alleged pro-
cedural failings during approval and promulgation of state plans after the section
307 thirty-day period had expired. Id. See pp. 253-73 infra.
42. 467 F.2d at 359 n.17, citing Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971);
EDF, Inc. v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401 (D.D.C. 1971).
43. 467 F.2d at 359 n.17.
44. 352 F. Supp. at 710. Section 307 of the Clean Air Act did not bar a federal
district court suit in Anaconda because EPA's proposed plan had not yet been prom-
ulgated. Id. at 702.
45. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
46. See notes 32-33 supra and accompanying text.
47. E.g., Davis v. Morton, - F.2d - (10th Cir. 1972); EDF, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); Upper Pecos Ass'n v. Stans, 452 F.2d 1233
(10th Cir. 1971); Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). See also cases
cited in - F. Supp. at -.
48. 352 F. Supp. at 710; see id. at 711-13.
49. Id. at 705.
50. Id. Apparently EPA based its argument on subsections 110(a)(2) and
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trary to the requirements of NEPA,51 and quoted with favor the Cal-
vert Cliffs' ruling that if a substantive decision affecting the environ-
ment were "reached procedurally without individualized considera-
tion and balancing of environmental factors . . . it is the responsi-
bility of the courts to reverse."'52
Although EPA does not now prepare impact statements for its
regulatory activities, the agency has indicated that it makes every
effort to carry out the broad purposes of NEPA, including consid-
eration of overall environmental effects of those actions.53 In prac-
tice, however, EPA recognizes that it does not always consider the
full range of environmental factors envisioned by NEPA. In Ana-
conda, for example, EPA contended that the Clean Air Act specified
that only environmental factors relating to air pollution could be con-
sidered in the establishment of air quality standards.54  Thus, the
fact that reduction of gaseous sulphur oxides might result not only
in great economic cost but also water pollution in the form of sul-
phuric acid, was not a consideration in EPA's promulgation of the
sulphur oxides regulation directed at Anaconda.5 5 The narrow view
of environmental responsibility demonstrated by EPA in Anaconda
runs counter to NEPA-which was not designed to operate inde-
pendently of other environmental legislation, but rather was intended
"to supplement existing, but narrow and fractionated, Congressional
declarations of environmental policy." 56  Thus, the particular en-
vironmental considerations to be taken into account under the Clean
Air Act-or any other statutory basis for regulatory environmental
(3) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857c-5(a)(2)-(3) (1970), which lists
criteria to be used for EPA approval of a state implementation plan. These
criteria encompass only air pollution considerations and may be contrasted with the
criteria under section 202(b) (5) (D) of the Act to be employed by EPA in ruling on
an application for suspension of the 1975 emission standards for light duty vehi-
cles, which include public interest, public health, and the welfare of the country. Id.
§ 1857f-1(b) (5) (D). See note 31 supra.
51. 352 F. Supp. at 710. See 42 U.S.C. §4332 (1970).
52. 449 F.2d at 1115.
53. Joint Hearings, supra note 28, at 549-50 (statement of William D. Ruckels-
haus).
54. 352 F. Supp. at 710. See also Joint Hearings, supra note 28, where it is
stated:
We do not think that NEPA applies to the setting of such standards so as
to require EPA to balance considerations of public health against economic
or other considerations, since this would be a clear violation of the Clean
Air Act mandate. Id. at 567 (Letter of William D. Ruckelshaus to Senator
Howard Baker, May 23, 1972). See note 50 supra.
55. 352 F. Supp. at 710, 713.
56. S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
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activity-may be the primary, but not the exclusive, considerations
for the environmental "balancing" NEPA requires.Y' Because of
EPA's central role in the protection and enhancement of the en-
vironment, its primary responsibility should be the careful balancing
of competing environmental and economic considerations envisioned
by NEPA. Proper "balancing" can be insured by requiring EPA to
adhere to the procedural provisions of section 102 of NEPA. In
view of the failure of EPA to adequately balance environmental and
economic factors in Anaconda, and the weakness of the legislative
history arguments advanced by EPA and CEQ, it cannot be said that
the Anaconda court erred in concluding that Congress intended all
federal agencies to file impact statements before embarking upon
regulatory activities.
Although the Anaconda holding applies to regulatory activities
under the Clean Air Act, the reasoning clearly could be extended to
EPA's other regulatory programs. Should NEPA's procedural re-
quirements be found applicable to all the regulatory activities of EPA,
it would appear that EPA will have to undertake major changes in
its regulatory procedures. EPA believes that the disadvantages of
the burden of preparing impact statements, for all regulatory activi-
ties which would be designated as major federal actions having a
significant impact upon the environment, might more than offset
the advantages accruing to the public. 5 There is some evidence
supporting this assertion. For example, the pesticides registration
program59 processed almost 4500 applications for new pesticides
registration, 8500 renewals of registrations, and over 10,000 amend-
ments to existing registrations in fiscal 1971.60 In comparison, all
federal agencies combined filed only 2388 impact statements from
the passage of NEPA in 1969 through January 31, 1972, of which
57. This appears to be consistent with the House Conference Report on NEPA
which stated:
[I]t is the intent of the [House) conferees that the provision "to the fullest
extent possible" [in § 102 of NEPA] shall not be used by any Federal
agency as a means of avoiding compliance with the directives set out in
section 102. Rather, the language of section 102 is intended to assure...
that no agency shall utilize an excessively narrow construction of its existing
statutory authorizations to avoid compliance. H. REP. No. 765, supra note
14, at 9-10 (emphasis added).
58. Joint Hearings, supra note 28, at 550 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus).
59. The pesticides registration program was transferred to the newly created
EPA from the Department of the Interior under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,
supra note 21.
60. Joint Hearings, supra note 28, at 548 (Statement of William D. Ruckelshaus).
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only 19 were filed by EPA. 1 It is obvious that even if only a small
percentage of the pesticide permits were found to be "major federal
actions" within the meaning of section 102,62 the EPA's workload in
this area would increase many times over, with concomitant cost and
delay. Air pollution and radiation activities of EPA might also oc-
casion a significant increase in that agency's workload should impact
statements be required for major regulatory actions.63
There are several ways, however, by which the difficulties of
preparing statements can be minimized if NEPA is applied to reg-
ulatory activities. The most readily apparent solution is for Con-
gress to provide selective, legislative relief for those regulatory ac-
61. Id. at 14 (statement of CEQ Chairman Russell E. Train). These figures
were compiled by the CEQ.
The environmental impact statements filed by the EPA were for waste treat-
ment facilities construction and water quality management plans approval; none
were prepared in connection with EPA regulatory activities. Id. at 580-81 (let-
ter from Sheldon Meyers, Director of the Office of Federal Activities of EPA to
Timothy Atkeson, General Counsel of CEQ, April 7, 1972).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
63. Section 108(a) of the Clean Air Act requires EPA to publish lists of
newly discovered harmful air pollutants. Id. § 1857c-3. EPA must subsequently
promulgate primary and secondary national ambient air quality standards for these
pollutants under section 109(a) (2), id. § 1857c-4(a) (2), 'and regulate the sale and
use of fuels under section 211(p), id. § 1857f-6c(c). See Greco, The Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970: Better Automotive Ideas from Congress, 3 ENVIRoNMENTAL
L. REP. 169 (1972); Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional
Cosmetic, 61 GEo. L.J. 153 (1972). See also ENViRONMENTAL REPORTER FEDERAL
REGULATIONS § 121 (1973) (compilation of EPA regulations).
EPA has two primary functions in regard to radiation protection guidance
and standards. The first involves the formulation of basic federal policies on radia-
tion protection and promulgation of Radiation Protection Guidelines which will be
applicable to all federal agencies concerned with radiation control. This responsi-
bility was assumed under Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, supra note 21, at 200,
from the now defunct Federal Radiation Council, Pub. L. 86-373 § 1(h), 73 Stat.
688 (1959). The second function is the establishment of environmental protec-
tion standards which limit radiation levels for areas adjacent to radiation-producing
installations such as nuclear power plants. Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, supra
note 21, at 200. See Environmental Protection Agency, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTER
51:1601, at 51:1622-24 (1973).
Since EPA itself is unsure as to the ultimate feasibility of preparing impact
statments for its own regulatory activities, it has initiated a study to consider the
effects of the section 102 process upon its own regulatory activities. Joint Hear-
ings, supra note 28, at 546 (statement of William D. Ruckelshaus). This study should
provide mtch needed information on the capabilities of NEPA to prepare impact
statements and perhaps will suggest alternatives to a complete exemption of EPA
regulatory activities from NEPA. Although a draft of the study has been com-
pleted it is not yet available. Letter from Alan W. Eekert, Attorney Advisor, EPA
to Duke Law Journal Feb. 21, 1973.
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tivities where the preparation of impact statements is not feasible,
as Congress has done in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments exempting EPA from NEPA's requirements in is-
suing Refuse Act permits.6 4  At least one source has suggested, how-
ever, that the best solution is not to exempt EPA completely from
the NEPA requirements, but rather to allow EPA and all agencies
greater procedural flexibility in coping with the general demands
of NEPA.6 5 Another possible means by which EPA might reduce
the number of section 102 statements would be to group together
regulatory programs or similar projects having a "common thread"
so as to make possible a single, comprehensive environmental state-
ment which would include detailed consideration of special circum-
stances. 6 Thus the "balancing" and "trade-off of values" inherent
in NEPA67 could be preserved, while the administrative burdens
in the preparation of many overlapping, individual impact state-
ments are simultaneously minimized.
64. See note 10 supra. The Joint Conference Report on the FWPCA stated
that:
If the actions of the [EPA] Administrator under this Act were subject to
the requirements of NEPA, administration of the Act would be greatly
impeded. S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1972).
65. Joint Hearings, supra note 28, at 505 (statement of George C. Freeman,
environmental attorney). Under this approach agencies could still be required to
perform the "balancing" NEPA envisions, but administrative cost and delay could
be reduced by allowing an agency to substitute less stringent procedural re-
quirements when strict adherence to section 102(2)(C) of NEPA would be unduly
burdensome.
66. This might be appropriate on an industry-wide basis (as in the case of reg-
ulations concerning radiological health), on a geographic basis (for example, regu-
lations based on a single, comprehensive examination of all air polluters in a given
region), or a combination of both approaches. For a general discussion of
"grouping," see Kalur v- Resor, Water Quality and NEPA's Application to EPA, 2
BNA ENVONmENTAL L. RE. 10,025, 10,028-29 (1971).
67. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
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